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ARTICLES
RULES AND STANDARDS

Pierre Schlag*

INTRODUCTION

Every student of law has at some point encountered the
"bright line rule" and the "flexible standard." In one torts
casebook, for instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo find themselves on opposite sides of a railroad
crossing dispute.' They disagree about what standard of
conduct should define the obligations of a driver who comes
to an unguarded railroad crossing. Holmes offers a rule:
The driver must stop and look.2 Cardozo rejects the rule
and instead offers a standard: The driver must act with reasonable caution. 3 Which is the preferable approach?
Holmes suggests that the requirements of due care at railroad crossings are clear and, therefore, it is appropriate to
crystallize these obligations into a simple rule of law.4 Cardozo counters with scenarios in which it would be neither
wise nor prudent for a driver to stop and look.5 Holmes
might well have answered that Cardozo's scenarios are ex* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A., Yale University, 1975; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1978. For their helpful comments on
earlier drafts and for their support, I wish to thank Tom Holdych, Debbie Maranville, Michael Newcity, Tom Richardson, David Skover, and Andy Walkover.
1. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 51-54 (3d ed. 1983). The dispute actually concerns two different railroads, but the issues are essentially the same. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
2. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
3. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. at 103-06.
4. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
5. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. at 104-06.
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ceptions and that exceptions prove the rule. Indeed,
Holmes might have parried by suggesting that the definition
of a standard of conduct by means of a legal rule is predictable and certain, whereas standards and juries are not. This
dispute could go on for quite some time.
But let's leave the substance of this dispute behind and
consider some observations about its form. First, disputes
that pit a rule against a standard are extremely common in
legal discourse. Indeed, the battles of legal adversaries
(whether they be judges, lawyers, or legal academics) are
often joined so that one side is arguing for a rule while the
other is promoting a standard. And this is true regardless of
whether the disputes are petty squabbles heard in traffic
court or cutting edge controversies that grace the pages of
elite law reviews. As members of the legal community, we
are forever involved in making arguments for or against
rules or standards. 6 This brings us to a second observation:
The arguments we make for or against rules or standards
tend to be pretty much the same regardless of the specific
issue involved. The arguments are patterned and stereotyped; the substantive context in which the arguments arise
hardly seems to influence their basic character. The arguments are drearily predictable, almost routine; they could
easily be canned for immediate consumption in a Gilbert's of
7
legal reasoning.
But if we accept these two observations, the implications are far from dreary or routine. On the contrary, it follows that much of legal discourse (including the very fanciest
law-talk) might be nothing more than the unilluminating invocation of "canned" pro and con arguments about rules
and standards. This prospect is neither dreary nor routine;
it is, however, somewhat humbling.
Lest undue humility get the upper hand, there are two
major ways of avoiding this vexing embarrassment. First, we
can argue that the two observations above are wrong. Unfortunately, I happen to think that they are in some sense
correct-and part of this Article is devoted to supporting
this contention.8 Second, we can argue that even if the ob6. See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 20-54 and accompanying text.
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servations are correct, there is more wisdom or rationality or
sense (or other good stuff) to the rules v. standards dispute
than first meets the eye. In other words, even if rules v. standards disputes are stereotyped, almost caricatured, forms of
argument, there may be more substance to these arguments
about form than we might have guessed. But I don't think
so: Ultimately, all the more promising conventional ways of
understanding the rules v. standards dispute will turn out to
be located within the bounds of that dispute. The conventional forms of legal thought allow us no place outside of the
rules v. standards dichotomy from where we can make sense
of the dispute. 9 In the end, no explanation (or all explanations) of the rules v. standards dispute is left standing. The
attempt to tie form to substance is just so much form.10
I.

DEFINING RULES AND STANDARDS

Thus far I have been pretending that the meanings of
"rules" and "standards" are self-evident. Before defining
these terms, a little background is necessary.
It is possible to look at positive law (constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, and administrative orders) as a series
of directives. The formula for a legal directive is "if this,
then that." A directive thus has two parts: a "trigger" that
identifies some phenomenon and a "response" that requires
or authorizes a legal consequence when that phenomenon is
present. Directives serve a number of substantive objectives
such as deterrence, allocation of entitlements, and inducement. Directives also haveformal dimensions. For instance,
directives can be general or specific,1 2 conditional or abso9. See infra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.

10. See infra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
11. This division of the directive into two component parts is rather conventional. See, e.g., Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 786, 786-87 (1967) (defining the two component parts of directives as a

description of a state of affairs and a statement of consequences that attach if the

specified state of affairs is present); see alsoJ. DABIN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAw
§ 42 (1944) (defining the "hypothesis" and the "solution" as the two components
constitutive of every legal rule), reprintedin K. WiLK, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF
LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 267 (1950); R. VON JHERING, L'EsPRrr Du DROIT
ROMAIN 52-53 (0. De Meulenaere trans. 1877).
12. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1689-90 (1976). For a microeconomic perspective on the functions of generality in legal directives, see Diver, The Optimal Precisionof Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
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lute,' 3 narrow or broad, 14 weak or strong.' 5 They can also
be rules or standards. Thus, the opposition of rules and
standards is one dimension of the form of a legal directive.1 6
Corresponding to the two parts of a directive, there are
two sets of oppositions that constitute the rules v. standards
dichotomy: The trigger can be either empirical or evaluative, and the response can be either determined or guided. 17
The paradigm example of a rule has a hard empirical trigger
and a hard determinate response. For instance, the directive
257 (1974). For a discussion of the delegative function of generality,
see Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 420-24
(1950); Friedman, supra note 11, at 832-35. For the view that generality is an
intrinsic aspect of systems for controlling and directing human activity, see L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 48 (1964).
13. There are hierarchies among legal directives. For instance, the text of the
United States Constitution provides directives for the creation and issuance of
other directives. Friedman, supra note 11, at 795. A legal directive can be called
"conditional" when significant jurisdictional prerequisites for application of the
directive can be found in other directives. By contrast, an "absolute" legal directive would be one whose jurisdictional prerequisites are relatively self-contained.
14. The breadth or narrowness of a legal directive refers to the amount of
territory it brings within its sweep. Some commentators propose that the breadth
of a legal directive is inversely proportional to its strength. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 260-61 (1977); Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment. A Play in ThreeActs, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 275-76 (1981).
15. The strength or weight of a directive is a measure of its intensity. The
more a directive demands to be followed in the face of potentially opposed values,
concerns, or directives, the stronger or heavier it is. See Raz, Legal Principlesand the
Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 832-33 (1972). Raz suggests that rules do have
weight. But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that rules, in contrast to
"principles," do not have weight).
For an exploration of these four formal dimensions of directives in the context of reconstructing the "framers intent," see Schlag, FramersIntent. The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283 (1985).
16. The terms "rules" and "standards" do not have clear and fixed meanings
in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., G. PATON, A TExTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
§ 48, at 236-38 (4th ed. 1972) (a legal rule is a precept prescribing definite consequences when certain facts exist; a rule operates by incorporating either standards
or concepts; standards are elastic, whereas concepts are rigid abstractions); see also
Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 12, at 258 (rules are distinguished from standards on
the grounds of precision and generality); Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in
Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REv. 475, 482-83, 485-86 (1933) (rules prescribe
definite, detailed legal consequences to a definite set of detailed facts; standards,
by contrast, specify a general limit of permissible conduct requiring application in
view of the particular facts of the case). The definitions of rules and standards
used in this Article are borrowed from Hart and Sacks, and Kennedy. H. Hart &
A. Sacks, The Legal Process 155-58 (unpublished manuscript tent. ed. 1958);
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1687-88; see supra note 12; infra note 17.
17. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 16; Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1687-88; see
also R. VON JHERING, supra note 11, at 48-56.
LEGAL STUD.
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that "sounds above 70 decibels shall be punished by a ten
dollar fine," is an example of a rule. A standard, by contrast,
has a soft evaluative trigger and a soft modulated response.
The directive that "excessive loudness shall be enjoinable
upon a showing of irreparable harm," is an example of a
standard.' 8
II.

THE RULES V. STANDARDS DIALECTIC

The possibility of casting or construing directives as
either rules or standards has given rise to patterned sets of
"canned" pro and con arguments about the value of adopting either rules or standards in particular contexts. I call
these stereotyped arguments the "dialectic." This dialectic
doesn't go anywhere. It is an arrested dialectic: There is no
moment of synthesis.
Exposing the mechanics of this dialectic is important for
a number of reasons. First, the dialectic seems to surface
across a wide variety of legal issues ranging from design defect litigation to the appropriate definition of collective bargaining units in labor law. 19 Second, the actors (often
18. There are all sorts of difficulties with these definitions of rules and standards-not the least of which is the question whether we should identify rules and
standards by means of a rule or a standard. Another perplexing question is where
we should look in deciding whether some directive is a rule or a standard: in the
law books, in the way the directive is administered, in the responses of those subjected to the directive? More troubling still is the question of what counts as one
complete directive. All these questions need not detain us here. They will resurface later. See infra text accompanying notes 64-100.
One additional note: Characteristics of rules and standards can be recombined to create new creatures of form. For instance, since rules are distinguished
from standards by reference to two parameters, trigger and response, "hybrid
directives" can be created. Hybrid directives combine a soft evaluative trigger
with a hard response or a hard empirical trigger with a soft mediated response.
"Excessively loud noises are punishable by a fine of $10" and "sounds above 70
decibels are enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable harm" are examples of hybrids. In this Article, I am not terribly interested in hybrids.
19. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A
Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1223-31 (1982) (noting the importance of the rules v. standards duality in fashioning directives to govern contract
disputes); Gilmore, Security Law, Formalismand Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REv. 659 (1968)
(discussing the history and probable effects of the transformation of rigid, rulelike personal property security law into the standard-like code of U.C.C. article 9);
Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Casefor Making Rules on Collective
Bargaining Units, 1981 LAB. LJ. 105 (suggesting that the NLRB should issue rules
to define the appropriate collective bargaining unit rather than engage in ad hoc
and post hoc determinations based on standards); Twerski, Seizing the Middle
Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed I'er-
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lawyers) making the arguments for or against either standards or rules as well as the significant audience (often
judges) seem to think that these arguments are important
and persuasive. Third, few lawyers, judges, and legal academics seem to recognize that much of legal argument is
simply the particular contextualized manifestation or application of these broader patterns of argument. Accordingly,
set forth below, are a number of stereotyped arguments
about rules and standards in the context of three "substantive" objectives of the legal system: 20 deterrence, delegation, and communication.
Deterrence
Many fields of law including tort, criminal, and regulatory law, are ostensibly designed to deter selected activities
or conduct. In any given situation, it is generally possible to
argue both that deterrence is best served by rules and that it
is best served by standards. The arguments are as follows:
Rules
Pro:

Con:

Rules draw a sharp line between forbidden and
permissible conduct, allowing persons subject to
the rule to determine whether their actual or
contemplated conduct lies on one side of the line
or the other. These persons are thus alerted to
the nature of the prohibited conduct and can
take steps to avoid it. The sharp line also assures
that no desirable or permissible conduct will be
chilled. Furthermore, rules mete out a fixed
quantum of predetermined deterrent, ensuring
that a certain penalty will be imposed for engaging in the prohibited conduct.
By specifying a sharp line between forbidden and
permissible conduct, rules permit and encourage
activity up to the boundary of permissible con-

dict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 542-50 (1982) (noting with
approval that courts in design defect litigation have seized the middle ground between rules and standards by rejecting rigid, single-factor duty rules and shunning
the general reasonableness standard tests).
20. Much of my development of the pro and con arguments for rules and
standards stems from Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1687-1701. Rather than repeatedly citing to Kennedy's seminal work, I acknowledge the considerable debt of
this section to Kennedy.
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duct. The application of the same deterrent
force to forbidden conduct regardless of how
close or far it may be from permissible conduct,
fails to distinguish between flagrant and technical violations. By predesignating and quantifying the magnitude of the penalty to be applied,
rules allow Holmes' proverbial bad man to treat
21
the deterrent as a fixed cost of doing business.
Standards
Pro:

Con:

21.

By describing the distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct in evaluative
terms, standards allow the addressees to make
individualized judgments about the substantive
offensiveness or nonoffensiveness of their own
actual or contemplated conduct. Because the
distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct is not fixed, but is case-specific, persons will be deterred from engaging in borderline conduct and encouraged to substitute less
offensive types of conduct. Standards authorize
application of a deterrent force proportional to
the gravity of the evil, thus assuring that the
strongest deterrent is reserved for and applied to
the greatest social threats.
Because standards do not draw a sharp line between permissible and impermissible conduct,
some risk-averse people will be chilled from engaging in desirable or permissible activities, and
some risk-preferring people will be encouraged
to engage in antisocial conduct. Because the
boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct is not preset, decision makers in borderline cases are likely to reach erratic results,
producing confusion about what is or is not permissible. The failure to announce in advance the
magnitude of the penalty prevents persons subject to the standard from determining how much
effort they should devote to avoiding violations.

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
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Delegation

Many fields of law such as agency, administrative, and
constitutional law are ostensibly designed to delegate functions, roles, or responsibilities to a variety of actors. As with
deterrence, both pro and con arguments can be advanced to
suggest that delegation is best effected by rules or by
standards.
Rules
Pro:

Rules delegate by granting the subordinate complete authority and responsibility for the performance of certain factually defined tasks. By
describing the subordinate's authority in empirical terms, the possibility of usurpation of authority or shirking of responsibility is minimized.
The need for tests of authority between superior
and subordinate is minimized, conflict is avoided
and time is saved. In granting complete authority over delegated matters, rules provide neat divisions of labor, thereby avoiding jurisdictional
disputes and friction.
Con: Using rules to define the scope and nature of the
subordinate's authority gives the subordinate
ready-made safe havens that allow avoidance of
responsibility or exercise of authority contrary to
the objectives of the superior. Authority conflicts and wasted time are likely to be significant
as the delegation by rules results in exercise of
authority or shirking of responsibility in ways
and in contexts not expected by the superior.
Because delegation by rule fails to discriminate
in terms of the relative import or value of the
matters that the subordinate performs, the likely
result is that some significant matters will be
handled by the subordinate, while some trivial
matters are referred to the superior for action.

Standards
Pro: Standards delegate by specifying the degree of
authority the subordinate is to exercise in terms
of the moral or aesthetic significance of the tasks.
Standards ensure that the subordinate will only

1985]
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exercise authority over less significant matters
and will refer more significant matters to the superior. Requiring that the subordinate make his
own judgments as to the significance of various
issues relieves the superior from a time consuming screening function. By relating the
subordinate's authority to the significance of the
tasks, the superior minimizes the cost of fallout
from the subordinate's erroneous decisions.
Delegating by standards means that the
subordinate will use whatever criteria he wants
to decide whether or not he will exercise authority. The judgments of subordinates about the
significance of various issues simply cannot be
trusted. Erroneous or subversive exercises of
authority or shirking of responsibility will necessitate costly and time consuming intervention by
the superior. By requiring the subordinate to
make difficult evaluative judgments, standards
increase the likelihood of erroneous determinations.

Communication/Formalities/Notice
Much of contract, civil procedure, and property law is
designed to establish a system by which various actors can
communicate and thus give legal effect to their intentions.
Again, there are pro and con arguments for the view that
these formalities are best governed by rules and for the view
that they are best governed by standards.
Rules
Pro:

Rules describe permissible modes of communication in empirical terms by specifying terms of
art, boilerplate messages, and acceptable methods of communication. By specifying routine
means of communication, rules minimize the
possibility of misunderstanding, making transactions more secure. Rules also make transactions
more secure because parties know their intentions will be honored by the decision maker and
because the costs of dispute resolutions are minimized. Rules reduce the cost of communicating
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intent or meaning by offering ready-made legal
boxes signifying different meanings and intents.
By attaching "either/or" consequences to communicative activity, rules encourage parties to
learn and master the routine means of communication and thus facilitate most communications
and transactions.
The specification of routine means of communication by rules restricts and truncates communication, and thwarts understanding. Some transactions will be deterred because their substance
cannot easily be communicated via the routinized means of communication and because failure to fit the transaction within an established
legal box may result in nullity. Formalities cast
in terms of rules can distort meaning and understanding and defeat authentic communication by
favoring those most adept at manipulating legal
boxes.

Standards
Pro: Standards delineate the formal requirements of
communications in evaluative terms designed to
ascertain whether there has been effective communication. By allowing the parties to choose
the most appropriate means of communication
in light of their particular substantive intentions,
standards minimize the possibility of distortion.
Because standards are cast in evaluative terms,
they place the onus on the parties to work out
and communicate their intentions completely
and thoroughly, thereby minimizing unexpected
or unconsidered consequences of their transaction. This obviates both frequent conflict and
the need for official intervention by a decision
maker. If ritualized communication can minimize transaction costs, standards allow the parties to develop their own rituals. By tailoring the
consequences of miscommunication to the gravity and the nature of the defect, standards serve
to enforce the parties' expectations as to matters
upon which communication was effective. In this
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way, standards give effect to the parties' intentions more accurately than the all-or-nothing
consequences of complete effectuation or nullity.
Con: Standards encourage the proliferation of a multiplicity of communicative means and mediums,
making communication more uncertain and
transactions less secure. Even ritualized forms of
communication established by the parties are insecure because there is a chance that the ritualized messages and meanings will not conform to
the standard. Because the validity of the communication cannot be determined in advance by
the parties, standards encourage parties who
have the most to lose from adhering to the communication to seek invalidation of the communication by an official decision maker. Because
standards provide a proportioned response to
miscommunication rather than an all-or-nothing
response, the parties cannot gauge in advance
what the consequences of miscommunication
will be.
These patterns of argument are familiar enough. They
occur frequently in legal discourse, albeit dressed in the
trappings of detail and the authority of concretion. Once we
have mastered the basic pattern of this rules v. standards dialectic, the canned arguments can be raised in just about any
context that can be portrayed as a rules v. standards dispute. 22 Whether or not the arguments will be persuasive in
any given context is another question-one that depends
largely on how the issues are framed, what values are held
dear, and other considerations that will be discussed later.
Part III of this Article attempts to show that the opposition of rules and standards is a frequent legal phenomenon.
In a sense, this might seem "underwhelming": If we divide
the world in two (say, between rules and standards) what
could be more predictable than the conclusion that every22. See infra text following note 100. The rules v. standards dialectic seems
well entrenched in less formal contexts such as child-rearing. Consider Johnny's
education: Should he be told that he cannot ride his bicycle on 4th and 5th
streets? On streets that have more than four lanes? Or on streets which are unsafe? Such child-rearing issues can lead to a parental version of the rules v. standards dialectic.
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thing falls into one category or the other? The point, however, is not that everything is either a rule or a standard, but
rather that, when controversy arises, the issue is often
framed as a rules v. standards dispute. More importantly,
the arguments that ensue track the dialectic fairly closely.
III.

RULES AND STANDARDS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In order to demonstrate the prevalence of the dialectic,
this Part shows how disputes about important issues in constitutional law track the dialectic. Indeed, within constitutional law, there seems to be an intricate hierarchy of rules v.
standards issues.
A.

Rules and Standards in Interpretation

In large measure, the currently fashionable disputes
about how the Constitution is to be interpreted track the dialectic. On one side we have "textualists" who demand fidelity to something they call "the text." 23 They expound a
rule: The text is the authoritative given that judges are
bound to follow. 24 Failure to adhere to this rule will bring

about all sort of evils, including judicial creativity and arbi23. The determination of what it is that has to be interpreted (i.e., the text) is
itself contested. The location of the boundary between text and context is by no
means fixed. Consider, for instance, three distinct versions of what constitutes the
text. First, there are the literalists who think that the text means literally the text.
One exponent of this view might be Justice Black, the one who reminded us that
where the first amendment says, "Congress shall make no law," it means "no
law." For further exploration of this perspective, see Cahn, Justice Black and the
First Amendment "Absolutes'" A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962). This
vision of the text, for obvious reasons, is not particularly popular with constitutional theoreticians. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 32 (1982). Then there are those who think that the constitutional text
might well encompass the written text as well as the "social text" of evolving standards of decency, public opinion, social morality, and so on. Brest, Intenpretation
and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 767-68 (1982); see also Leedes, An Acceptable
Meaning of the Constitution, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1003 (1984) (describing the Constitutional text dynamically as an ongoing process of clarification). A third and particularly sweeping view of the text denies any discontinuity between the written text
and moral philosophy. Remarks of Dworkin, Symposium: ConstitutionalAdjudication
and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 537 (1981). For an interesting attempt to
reclaim the constitutional text as a secular (read: nonmystical) legal document, see
Grey, The Constitution as Smpture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
24. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 384 (1981); Van
Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributionsof Special Theories of
JudicialReview, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 225-26 (1983).
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trariness. 25 Indeed, according to the textualists, abandonment of the textualist rule by the Court will yield a
Constitution whose meaning will be neither certain nor pretextualism are, of course,
dictable. 2 6 These arguments for
27
genre.
pro-rule
the
in
steeped
Closely related to textualism is the "intentionalist"
view. Intentionalists maintain that the Court should adhere
to the framers' intent in interpreting the Constitution. Intentionalists also make pro-rule arguments for their posi25. Or as Judge Bork put it: "Where constitutional materials do not clearly
specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other. Thejudge must stick close to the text and the history,
and their fair implications, and not construct new rights." Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 8 (1971); see Rehnquist, The Notion
of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 700-04 (1976) (attributing errant and
offensive Supreme Court decisions to interpretive departures from the text and
the intent of the framers); Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 213-19 (describing the
considerable costs of judicial adventures in constitutional interpretation and defending a return to the text).
26. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 218.
27. The textualist position with regard to interpretation is not without irony:
much of the text of the Constitution reads (literally) like standards. It does seem
that most constitutional provisions that are considered important from a litigation
perspective read like standards. In actuality, however, it may be that we are simply accustomed to reading these provisions as standards.
It was not always thus. Consider the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. Currently, we are probably accustomed to construing this clause as a standard. See Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). During the heyday of
dual sovereignty, however, the commerce power seems to have been interpreted
as a rule. Thus, commerce itself was defined in terms of specific transactions:
Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among
the several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and
articles bought, sold or exchanged for the purposes of such transit
among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated, but
this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895). And of course,
"[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." 1d. at 12. As for
the power to regulate commerce, it "is the power to prescribe the rule by which
commerce shall be governed." Id. But commerce must be regulated directly: It
would not do to allow regulation of manufacturing under the commerce clause,
for although "the exercise of that power may result in bringing the operation of
commerce into play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and
indirectly." Id. In short, the commerce clause during the dual sovereignty days
seems rule-like. In fact Justice Fuller's opinion in E.C. Knight comes replete with
pro-rule rhetoric about the importance of holding the line between the commerce
power and the police power, even in the face of "acknowledged evils, however
grave and urgent they may appear to be .... ." Id. at 13.
In sum, our willingness to see standards when we look at the constitutional
text may be more a reflection of our own predispositions than a revelation about
what is truly there.
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tion.28 And certainly, the pattern of attacks on the
intentionalist proposals seems to track anti-rule reasoning.
The classic attack on intentionalism holds that political and
moral value judgments are essential to the reconstruction of
framers' intent and that these judgments cannot be fur29
nished by interpretive rules or by the framers themselves.
On the standard side of the interpretive question are
those who would interpret the Constitution in terms of
norms such as the contemporary value consensus of the
community, fairness, and evolving standards of decency. 30
One particularly standard-like approach is offered by Brest,
who sets forth five highly value-charged interpretive considerations. 3 ' The classic attack on such "nonoriginalist" approaches sounds in anti-standard thought: nonoriginalism
28. I have argued that the intentionalist position both relies upon and attempts to maintain a clean and narrow vision of law uncontaminated by normativity and political dimensions. See Schlag, supra note 15. The very possibility and
desirability of following the framers' intent presumes a rule-oriented vision of
constitutional interpretation. In other words, if the framers' intent is not some
clearly ascertainable thing fixed in history, or if one is not truly bound in a rigid
way to follow that intent, the search for the original understanding loses its raison
d'&re. Id. The corroboration that intentionalism is steeped in the rule genre
comes from an examination of the arguments that are made against intentionalism: Commentators committed to the enforcement of the original understanding
are attacked for underestimating the complexities and the value judgments involved in applying their theories of framers' intent. The presence of such complex value judgments vitiates whatever attraction intentionalism otherwise might
have had. Put simply: If framers' intent is standard-oriented, there is very little to
recommend it. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786-804 (1983).
29. This is the classic pattern of argument advanced by those opposed to
framers' intent as an interpretive norm. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 208-20 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981); Tushnet, supra note 28, at
798-801.
30. See, e.g., Grey, Do Ve Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
706 (1975); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police Power: The EthicalFunction
of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 713-33 (1976); Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
L.J. 221, 266-67 (1973).
31. Brest suggests that a constitutional decision should:
(I) foster democratic government;
(2) protect individuals against arbitrary, unfair and intrusive official action;
(3) conduce to a political order that is relatively stable, but which also responds to changing conditions, values and needs;
(4) not readily lend itself to arbitrary decisions or abuses; and
(5) be acceptable to the populace.
Brest, supra note 29, at 226.
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allows judges to reach just about any result they want.3 2 The
nonoriginalists respond with pro-standard rhetoric: everything is very complicated; the Constitution has to be applied
to an incredible number33of different contexts; flexibility and
sensitivity are required.
B. Rules and Standards in Deciding Who Should Decide
The dialectic also surfaces at another level: Should
rules or standards be used to decide whose interpretation of
the Constitution should be applied when? This kind of
question arose, for instance, in the legislative veto decision,
INS v. Chadha.34 ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the Court,
held that a federal statutory provision allowing a one-house
veto violated both the presentment and bicameralism
clauses of the Constitution.3 5 The Chief Justice's choice to
rely on these clauses-declaring that they were not "empty
formalities"-exemplifies a rule-oriented approach.3 6 After
all, the presentment and bicameralism clauses read like
rules. Confirming the rule-orientation of the majority opinion, Justice White's dissent criticized Chief Justice Burger's
approach on classic anti-rule grounds: overinclusiveness.
Justice White made the overinclusiveness argument by
pointing out that the majority's approach "appears to invalidate all legislative vetoes irrespective of form or subject
37
matter."
32. Thus, one of the classic attacks on the noninterpretivists is that the approach can yield just about any result. See Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of
Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 696 (1979) (suggesting that the philosophical approaches to the Constitution can reach any result); Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 228-29. Sometimes this charge is combined
with the further accusation that the noninterpretivists are politically motivated in
some unseemly way. See id. at 228.
33. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962); Brest, supra note 29,
at 226-27.
34. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
35. Id. at 956-58.
36. Id. at 958 n.23. Commentators have noted the rigid definitional approach
used by Burger in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), as well as the absence of
pragmatic or normative concerns in his opinion. See Smolla, Bring Back the Legislative Veto: A Proposalfor a ConstitutionalAmendment, 37 ARK. L. REV. 509, 515-16
(1983); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 189-90 (1983).
37. Justice White noted: "Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as
unconstitutional; to strike an entire class of statutes based on consideration of a
somewhat atypical and more readily indictable exemplar of the class [as Burger
did here] is irresponsible." 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice White's dissent formulates and disposes of the
relevant issues in a typical standard-oriented manner. Not
only does he examine the issue under the light of the more
standard-like separation of powers doctrine, but also his description of that doctrine is steeped in the pro-standard
genre. He states that separation of powers has a "history of
accommodation and practicality." Separation of powers has
not led to "undue prophylactic measures that handicap the
effective working of the national government as a whole."3 8
"[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions."3 9 Only such a standard will allow government to
address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues. Justice Burger answers these arguments in pro-rule terms: If
one is to avoid tyranny, then it is necessary to adhere to
"those hard choices [that] were consciously made by men
[the Framers] who had lived under a form of government
that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go
40
unchecked."
C. Rules and Standards in Substantive ConstitutionalLaw:
Freedom of Speech
Disputes about the meaning of freedom of speech are
often cast as rules v. standards disputes. Questions concerning the scope and intensity of the free speech clause and
questions about appropriate judicial methodology for the
framing and resolution of free speech issues often track the
dialectic.
Consider first the question of what speech is protected
by the first amendment. One type of theory suggests that
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1000 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977)).
40. Id. at 959. This sort of "brave manly" talk about the necessity for holding
the line is classic pro-rule rhetoric. For another example of this hold-the-line talk,
see supra note 27. Indeed, one possible way of understanding the rules v. standards dialectic is in terms of a male/female distinction. Rules have this striking,
tough, hold-the-line, realpolitik, abstract-as-can-be quality to them, whereas standards are signposts suggesting sensitive treatment of all aspects of the problem in
context. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (discussing the
morality of rights (rules?) and the morality of responsibility (standards?)).
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only political speech is protected: There are rule-like and
standard-like versions of this type of theory. Judge Bork has
offered a particularly rule-like variant. Relying on the notion
of neutral principles, Bork argues that the first amendment
protects only political speech-defined as "criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal
of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the
country." 41 The classic response to such a rule-like vision is
that it would freeze the contours and content of protected
speech by linking protection to a particular political, economic, and social structure. 42 An arguably more standardlike vision of political speech is offered by Meiklejohn. He
argues that the free speech clause protects "public
speech"-all speech relating to issues which bear upon our
common life. The classic attack on this vision is that either it
is rule-like in the same manner as Bork's and thus underinclusive in its failure to accord protection to literature, scholarship, and art; or, instead, it is standard-like, in which case
the realm of protected speech knows no limits. 43 Respond-

41. Bork, supra note 25, at 29. Judge Bork ties his conception of political
speech to empirical institutional referents:
The category of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy, or personnel, whether
the governmental unit involved is executive, legislative, judicial or
administrative. Explicitly political speech is speech about how we
are governed, and the category therefore includes a wide range of
evaluation, criticism, electioneering and propaganda.
Id. at 27-28.
42. And that is simply not permissible for a theory of freedom of speech-or
so goes one classic argument against rule-like definitions of the realm of protected
speech. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. L. REV. 237, 239-41
(1978).
43. One commentator observed:
The most serious weakness in Mr. Meiklejohn's argument is that
it rests on his supposed boundary between public speech and private
speech. That line is extremely blurred. . . . The truth is that there
are public aspects to practically every subject. . . . The author recognizes this when he says that the First Amendment is directed
against "mutilation of the thinking process of the community". ...
This attitude, however, offers such a wide area for the First Amendment that very little is left for his private speech . . ..
On the other hand, if private speech does include scholarship
. ..and also art and literature, it is shocking to deprive these vital
matters of the protection of the inspiring words of the First
Amendment.
Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1949); see also Schlag, An
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ing to the claim that his theory was fatally underinclusive in
defining the realm of protected speech, Meiklejohn opted
for a frankly standard-like rendition of his theory: Protected
speech includes speech from which the voters derive
"knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values, the
capacity for sane and objective judgment. . ... 44 The critical response was classic anti-standard rhetoric: Judges could
draw the line anywhere with this standard; people would not
know whether or when their speech is protected. 45
The rules v. standards dialectic is also manifest in the
debate over whether different types of speech ought to be
accorded different degrees of protection. Defining subcategories of protected speech (e.g., commercial, indecent,
political) seems rule-like when compared to an approach
that would accord protection to all speech based on the extent to which first amendment values are implicated in individual cases. The rule-like approach of creating
subcategories brings with it classic objections to rules.
"Quite obviously . . . a particular speech may in fact cut

across these artificial lines, readily embarrassing an attempt
to say which kind of speech it was. The libelous may well be
related to the political utterance, the aesthetic may be quite
inseparable from the allegedly obscene." 46 Of course, the
standard-like approach of doing without subcategories raises
objections as well. The delineation of different degrees of
protection for speech without the aid of subcategories
harbors some classic defects of standard. This approach
gives no advance notice of how much any given piece of
speech is protected and allows judges to reach any result
they want.
In any event, the Court seems to have moved beyond
this debate by recognizing various subcategories of free
Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 707-09
(1983) (attacking the categorical structure of Meiklejohn's theory); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915,
935-38 (1978) (criticizing both the narrow and the broad version of Meiklejohn's
theory).
44. Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 256.
45. See supra note 43.
46. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
107, 141 (1982); see Schauer, Categoriesand the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts,
34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 288 (1981) (noting that subcategorization brings with it the
risk of loose and overlapping boundaries).
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47
speech such as defamatory, commercial, and indecent.
The rules v. standards dispute continues, however, at a different, more concrete level: How should the various categories be defined?
Both rule-like and standard-like definitions of commercial speech have been offered in the case law. A particularly
rule-like definition of commercial speech is speech which
48
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.
This definition is significantly both overinclusive and underinclusive: arguably, even advertising does more than propose a commercial transaction, and arguably, there is much
speech that we would want to call commercial that does not
propose a commercial transaction. 49 Standard-like definitions of commercial speech have been offered as well; for
example, commercial speech is speech related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and the audience. 50 But as
Justice Stevens argued, it is unclear whether the limiting factor in this definition is the subject matter of the speech or
the motivation of the speaker. 51
Even when there is agreement about how the varieties
of speech should be defined, the rules v. standards dispute
resurfaces in the attempt to ascertain how such speech is
protected against governmental suppression or regulation.
One rule-like position is that once speech is found to be protected, it remains protected regardless of the weighty reasons the state might advance to justify suppression or
regulation.5 2 A more standard-like approach would insist
upon an accommodation of the values served by the first
amendment and the state interests; the nature of the accommodation would depend upon the relative importance of the
values and the extent to which they are implicated in con47. See Schauer, supra note 46, at 290-96 (discussing the defamatory, indecent
speech, and commercial speech subcategories of the first amendment).
48. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
49. Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. L. REv. 1212, 1228-29 (1983).
50. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
51. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring.)
52. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
422 (1980); Meiklejohn, supra note 44; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 56-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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crete settings. 53
The dialectic here traces the so-called balancing v. absolutism debate. This debate is captured in the conflicting
views of Frantz and Mendelson. 54 Mendelson argued that a
balancing approach was preferable to absolutist or categorical approaches because balancing requires a particularized
justification for ajudge's decision. This discourages reliance
upon untested prejudices. Moreover, balancing is an economical judicial style because it allows the least interference
with legislative choices while maintaining our traditional vision ofjudicial review. These are classic pro-standard arguments. Frantz's response displays the classic features of
anti-standard arguments. Frantz argued that balancing is
unlikely to yield uniform and impartial results. Balancing is
highly uncertain in that it provides no secure minimum first
amendment protection. Moreover, balancing provides no
advance notice of whether speech is or is not protected.
In sum, it seems apparent that the rules v. standards dispute can occur at many different levels in the intricate hierarchy of directives and issues known as constitutional law.
Obviously, we could go on and identify rules v. standards
disputes in constitutional law indefinitely. This is a task I
would rather not undertake.
The important thing to recognize is that many controversial issues in constitutional law (and elsewhere) are often
cast as disputes over the relative appropriateness of rules
and standards. This recognition prompts a nagging and
perhaps dispiriting question: Is there any substance to this
heady and learned law-talk or is most of the argumentation
simply the concrete manifestation of the dialectic in different
contexts? The next Part defers this impertinent question
and seeks instead to examine the rational accounts that
might explain the dialectic.
53. See Schlag, supra note 43, at 731-39; Shiffrin, supra note 49, at 1251-55.
Both articles defend the accommodation of values by contextualization.
54. From here on out the battle of the pro-rule and pro-standard positions
traces the Frantz-Mendelson debate on absolutism v. balancing. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment
Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The
First Amendment and theJudicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479
(1964); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).

1985]

RULES AND STANDARDS
IV.

399

ExPLAINING THE DIALECTIC

Perhaps the most common view of the rules v. standards
dialectic ascribes one set of virtues and vices to rules and
another set of virtues and vices to standards. 55 According to
this view, the choice between formulating or interpreting a
legal directive as a rule or as a standard is a choice between
competing values such as certainty or flexibility, uniformity
or individualization. 56 A second explanation, offered by
Kennedy, is the structuralist view that the dialectic is associated with deep value rifts between altruist and individualist
outlooks. 5 7 A third view explains the dialectic in terms of
the number of interrelated variables relevant to the resolution of a legal issue. Under this view, standards are more
appropriate than rules when an issue is polycentric. 58 A
fourth explanation of the rules v. standards dialectic links
the choice between rules or standards with the amount or
depth of learning available on any given legal issue.5 9 In
terms of this explanation, rules are the optimal form of legal
directives and standards merely serve as "standbys" in the
absence of knowledge or learning on the issue sufficient to
formulate a rule.
None of these explanations is satisfactory.
55. The attempt to rationalize the dichotomy is obviously enticing: Given that
it plays such a significant role in legal discourse, a demonstration of its intrinsic
rationality becomes important in redeeming legal discourse generally as a rational
enterprise.
56. See infra text accompanying note 60.
57. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1712-22; see infra text accompanying notes
86-92.

58. The argument that standards are more appropriate when an issue is
polycentric is loosely derived from Fuller's account of the limits of adjudication. See
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 393-405 (1978);
infra text accompanying notes 93-94.

59. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. Such an argument might be
teased out of the provocative suggestions of Curtis:

What the author of a legal document is trying to control is the
future itself.
• . . You are trying to stabilize a part of the future, set it on a

course, make it more foreseeable and more reliable.
• . . But what happens in the future is necessarily uncertain, in-

choate, contingent, only partly foreseeable, and you must therefore
find some similar and corresponding quality in the words you are

using. Briefly, your words should be as flexible, as elastic, indeed as
vague, as the future is uncertain and unpredictable. I say vague, because bothflexible and elastic imply sharp edge and definite contours.
Curtis, supra note 12, at 423-24 (emphasis in original).
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Of Vices and Virtues

Perhaps the most common understanding of the rules v.
standards dialectic attempts to explain it in terms of a normative coherence in the legal order. According to this
"vices and virtues" view of the world, the choice between
adopting a rule or a standard is a choice between competing
virtues and vices that we typically associate either with rules
or with standards. Rules, for instance, are said to be appropriate when certainty, uniformity, stability, and security are
highly valued, whereas standards are seen as more appropriate when flexibility, individualization, open-endedness, and
dynamism are important. The set of virtues and vices that
are typically associated with rules and standards might be
diagrammed as follows:
Rules

Standards

virtues

vices

certainty
uniformity
stability
security

intransigence
regimentation
rigidity
closure

virtues

flexibility
individualization
open-endedness
dynamism

vices

manipulability
disintegration
indeterminacy
adventurism

No doubt more virtues and vices could be added to the list.60

This understanding of rules and standards is neither exotic nor original. Typically, when a legal dispute pits a rule
against a standard, we can expect the proponent of the rule
to trot out arguments about the importance of such legal virtues as certainty and stability. No doubt, the champion of
the rule will add that these virtues are best served by rules.
We can also expect the proponent of the standard to retort
that rules are rigid and inflexible and that a standard would
be more appropriate. In short, we can expect rules v. standards disputes to track the vices and virtues analysis. This
correspondence between the vices and virtues view of the
world and the dialectic, of course, suggests that the dialectic
could be understood in terms of the vices and virtues vision.
From the vices and virtues perspective, the choice between
rules and standards depends upon which competing virtues
60. The list in the text is an abridged and revised version of one developed by
Duncan Kennedy. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1710. It is not necessary to my
argument that everyone acquiesce in the distribution of virtues and vices I have
made among rules and standards in every case. I do assume, however, that this
distribution seems on the whole sensible or familiar to the reader.
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(certainty or flexibility) are desired most, or similarly, which
alternative vices (rigidity or indeterminacy) are dreaded
most.
There is something appealing about this explanation.
First, it rings of the familiar: it confirms what we have
known all along. Second, the explanation imports a meaningful normative coherence to the choice between rules and
standards. A preference for either rules or standards can be
seen as a coherent normative choice about which values
ought to be preferred in a given context. This is all very
comforting.
It is also quite insufficient. After all, most members of
the legal community think of "law" as a complex and intricate system that administers or governs an incredibly large
variety of matters. If this is what "law" is like, then how
could something as simple as the vices and virtues vision explain why our arguments about rules and standards seem to
congeal into the equally simple stereotypical patterns of argument that I have dubbed "the dialectic"? Something does
not fit here. A belief in the dialectic and the vices and virtues vision is inconsistent with the view of law as complex
and intricate. Something has to go.
We can retain the dialectic and the vices and virtues vision if we reconsider the underlying view that law is intricate
and complex. We need only make two (quite plausible) assumptions about the character of the legal system in order to
rehabilitate the explanatory power of the vices and virtues
vision: The number of substantive objectives that can be
served by legal directives is very small, and these substantive
objectives are ambivalent in that they all bring into play
countervailing objectives. Once we admit that this vision of
the legal system animates much of legal discourse, then it
becomes possible to understand how the vices and virtues
vision can yield the dialectic. But first, I must explain the
two assumptions. The substantive objectives of the legal
system are few and ambivalent:
1. On an abstract level, the set of substantive objectives
a
that legal directive may serve can be seen as fairly limited:
deterrence
allocation
communication
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delegation
6
inducement
Other substantive objectives could no doubt be added
to this list, but soon they would begin to overlap and collapse into each other. My point is that any legal directive
can arguably be characterized as serving to effect one or a
combination of the objectives on the list above. Furthermore, this view of the legal system is not exotic in the least,
but rather conforms to widely held (often implicit or subconscious) beliefs within the legal community as to how legal
directives function.
2. All of these substantive objectives are ambivalent in
the sense that they necessarily bring into play competing
objectives. For example, the aim of deterring certain conduct immediately gives rise to the concern that permissible
or desirable conduct not be chilled-(empowerment). Likewise, the objective of delegation necessarily brings into play
the need to circumscribe that delegation-(control). Thus,
the substantive objectives of the legal order are ambivalent
in that they necessarily entail countervailing objectives, as
follows:
deterrence/empowerment
allocation/retention
communication/silence
delegation/control
inducement/restraint
Because the substantive objectives of the legal order are ambivalent, we may draw the line between the opposed sets of
substantive objectives in ways that further...
61. One could think of other substantive objectives that a legal order might
serve, such as legitimation, see, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978), repression, see, e.g., I. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL
REPRESSION (2d ed. 1977), mystification, see, e.g., Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal
Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW & Soc'y REV. 571
(1977), or ludic satisfaction, see, e.g., Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 998-1008
(1978). One could go on indefinitely.
These types of objectives do not belong on my list. I am trying to give a
mainstream account of the objectives of the legal system-the sort of objectives
that the law student, or lawyer, or law professor might rely upon when acting in
their respective role-constrained situations: the exam, the legal argument, the
traditional tenure piece.
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Rule virtues
certainty
uniformity
stability
security

or

403
Standard virtues
flexibility
individualization
open-endedness
dynamism

For instance, consider the railroad crossing example
mentioned at the beginning of this Article 2 and assume that
the problem is to formulate a directive that will deter negligent behavior while allowing drivers to cross the railroad
lines without waste of time or effort. The deterrence/empowerment line can be drawn in either a rule-like
or standard-like way. If we want certainty, uniformity, stability, Justice Holmes' "stop and look" rule might seem attractive.6 3 From a standards perspective, however, this rule is
undesirable: Not all railroad crossing situations require that
the driver stop and look. Similarly, stopping and looking
sometimes is not enough. From the standards perspective,
flexibility, individualization, and open-endedness best serve
to deter negligence without imposing needless rituals. As
this illustration shows, it is possible to draw the line between
the competing substantive objectives in either standard-like
or rule-like ways.
The number of permutations one can draw in attempting to relate the substantive objectives of directives to the
vices and virtues of either rules or standards is limited by the
fact that there seems to be a family resemblance among the
set of virtues associated with rules and a different family resemblance among the set of virtues associated with standards. If one were taking the Law School Admissions Test
and asked to segregate the following list of eight virtues into
two groups of four I suspect that a lot of people would organize the eight virtues according to the following pattern:
certainty/uniformity/stability/security ...
rule 'virtues).

(i.e.,

flexibility/individualization/open-endedness/dynamism. . . (i.e., standard virtues).
In short, the number of conceptually distinct virtues and
vices that can be ascribed to rules or standards is small.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Because the virtues and vices attributed to rules and
standards are limited and patterned, and because the substantive objectives of the legal order are seen as limited and
ambivalent, the number of possible permutations that can be
drawn to relate rules or standards to the substantive objectives is small. In these circumstances, it should come as no
surprise that the arguments for and against rules and standards should be stereotyped in the manner of the dialectic.
In each case of substantive line drawing there is a rule-like
and a standard-like way of drawing the line between the conflicting substantive objectives. The arguments we make for
drawing these lines in rule-like or standard-like ways are informed by the vices and virtues ascribed to rules and standards. The arguments themselves are none other than the
dialectic.
Thus, given the appropriate view of the legal order, the
vices and virtues vision can explain the dialectic-including
its stereotyped character. Of course, our initial interest in
the vices and virtues vision did not stem merely from its explanatory potential-the vices and virtues vision promised to
ground the dialectic in normatively meaningful choices between competing values. Unfortunately, the view of the
legal order we have had to adopt to save the explanatory
potential of the vices and virtues vision makes that promise
illusory. In order to explain the dialectic in terms of the
vices and virtues vision, we had to make two assumptions
about the character of the legal system, to wit: that the substantive objectives of the legal system are few and
ambivalent.
Once one makes these two additional assumptions, the
picture of the legal system that emerges is far from flattering. Legal discourse emerges as crude, shallow, and formalistic. And if the dialectic is grounded on such a picture of
the legal system (as it may well be) then the dialectic may
itself be nothing but a highly formalistic exercise bereft of
any significant connection to vices or virtues. If so, perhaps
we should be suspicious of legal arguments that resemble
any part of the dialectic.
Indeed, arguments (fancy and otherwise) that partake of
the dialectic (including most of the constitutional law arguments discussed in the last section) may be nothing more
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than the contextualized manifestations of formalistic
mechanics.
This conclusion is not necessarily correct. If, however,
we recognize the stereotypical, patterned character of the dialectic, and if we seek to explain this character, then ultimately, we will have to concede that the actors who invoke
the dialectic must necessarily rely, at least implicitly, on a
structural view of the legal system that is fairly simple. The
assumptions that the substantive objectives of the legal system are few and ambivalent are at once a plausible account
of how members of the legal community view the legal system and an account that is sufficiently simple to allow the
vices and virtues view of the world to yield the dialectic.
So far, the discussion of the vices and virtues vision has
been premised on the undeniably powerful and widely held
notion that rules promote certain virtues (or vices) while
standards serve other virtues (or vices). The discussion
which follows attempts to deconstruct that vision.
It is extremely difficult to shake the view that rules are
certain and predictable and that standards are flexible and
individualized. We are likely to regard a person suggesting
that standards are just as certain as rules and that rules are
just as flexible as standards with the withering grimace usually reserved for lunatics who spend their time arguing
against tautologies. This, of course, raises an interesting
point: If it is mere definitional commitments that make rules
certain and standards flexible, then the vices and virtues
view of rules and standards is exceedingly shallow. If we are
interested in a claim that rules are certain and standards
flexible, the proposition has to be true in more than a definitional sense.
My strategy for deconstructing this vices and virtues vision is based on the relentless application of a few simple
moves:64

1. No rule or standard (or any other piece of text) can
control or determine the context within and from which
it is interpreted.
2. The interpretation of a rule or a standard (or any
64. The moves in this section are inspired by readings of J. CULLER, ON
DECONSTRUCTION (1982); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); S. FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); M. RYAN, MARXISM AND DECONSTRUCTION

(1982).
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other piece of text) varies as the picture of the context is
changed or altered.
3. There is no privileged (or secure) context from
which any rule or standard (or any other piece of text)
must be read.
4. Any attempt to use a text to privilege a particular
context for the interpretation of a rule or a standard (or
any other piece of text) must itself be subject to dispute
given (1) above.
5. If rules seem to partake of rule virtues and standards of standard virtues, it is because the context in
which they apply has already been characterized as rulelike or standard-like. But given (2) and (3) above there
is no reason to think that this picturing is particularly
privileged.
These moves are used to show that the vices and virtues vision of the dialectic either lapses into tautology or results in
demonstrably untenable views.
What does it mean to say that rules are certain? It
might mean something like this: "If a rule is interpreted
correctly, then the interpreters can be certain about whether
the rule applies in a given case and what the rule requires."
The problem with using the frame of reference of "correct
interpretation" for rules is that we can say the same thing
about standards: "If a standard is interpreted correctly,
then the interpreters can be certain about whether the standard applies in a given case and what the standard requires."
Using "correct interpretation" as the frame of reference to
ascertain what values are served by rules and standards truncates the analysis to the point where it becomes uninteresting. It is arguable that if standards were correctly
interpreted, they would exhibit not only all the standard virtues (i.e., flexibility) but also all the rule virtues (i.e., certainty). Under ideal conditions anything is true-but only
because ideal conditions make anything true.
We could argue, instead, that the view that rules are certain means that they are more susceptible to correct interpretation than standards. Likewise, the purported flexibility
of standards might mean that standards are more likely than
rules to allow discretion by the interpreter. But why should
this be? Again, one answer is that it is true by definition.
But is it true in any more interesting way?
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I doubt it. There is no reason to believe that a rule or a
standard supplies the context in which it is applied free from
the influence of concerns external to that context. In other
words, a rule or a standard does not unequivocally point to a
perfectly defined context in which the rule or the standard
must be applied. On the contrary: the construction of the
context in which the rule or the standard should be applied
can only be decided in context. Is there then no way to privilege a particular context-no way to say, "Look, stop this
nonsense. This, I tell you is the context to which the rule or
the standard must be applied?" Certainly, it seems inadequate to use a rule or a standard to identify the context.
Such a strategy would merely provoke the cipher of the infinite regress. After all, the question whether a piece of text
(such as a rule or a standard) applies to a given context is a
function of context.
If a directive does not exercise complete control over
the context to which it applies, then there is no reason to
suppose that the directive will necessarily or even probably
exhibit its abstract, characteristic virtues or vices when applied to that context. Rather, everything depends upon how
the context is described. Whether a rule exhibits certainty
when applied in a given context depends upon whether the
context is described in a way that is hospitable to rule-like
treatment. I will give one short and one long example.
I assume that most people consider the Miranda rule to
be an example of certainty and predictability. 65 That is
probably because they think that if a police officer fails to
give Miranda warnings during a custodial interrogation any
confession and its fruits will be excluded from evidence.
And indeed, if one sees the context in which Miranda is applied in terms of police officers, interrogations, custody, the
warnings on those little cards, and the judge excluding evidence, then indeed the Miranda rule is certain and predictable, and maybe even stable. But there is no reason that one
should have that particular context in mind. Try this one
instead. The Miranda rule applies in a context of avoiding
coercion by the instrumentalities of the state, furthering procedural fairness, and mitigating inequalities of wealth and
education during confrontations between law enforcement
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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officials and members of less privileged groups. 66 Now if
this is the context in which Mirandais applied, it seems transparent that the rule is anything but an example of certainty,
predictability, or stability.
Another example helps illustrate the point. 67 The State
Environmental Policy Act of Washington state ("SEPA") requires an environmental impact statement ("EIS") to be included "in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting
the quality of the environment.
...
68 Pursuant to SEPA,
a state agency was directed to promulgate guidelines specifying "categories of governmental actions exempt from" environmental impact statements. 69 The state agency
developed the following exceptions to the environmental
impact statement requirement:
The construction or designation of bus stops, loading
zones, shelters, access facilities and pullout lanes for taxicabs, transit and school vehicles. .

.

. The construction

or installation of minor road and street improvements
such as paving marking .

.

. street lighting, guardrail

and barricade installation, installation of catch basins and
culverts, and reconstruction of existing road bed ....
including adding or widening of shoulders, addition of
bicycle lane, paths and facilities, and pedestrian walks
and paths, but not including additional automobile
lanes.70
This statement of rule-like exceptions to the EIS requirement seems clear enough.
Recently, Seattle made a series of changes to the traffic
patterns by altering bus and loading zones, lane markings,
sign, and signal changes. 71 These changes appeared to fall
within the EIS exceptions. And in a challenge to the city's
actions for failure to perform an EIS analysis, a trial court
agreed. 72 So far so good: The EIS exceptions look like
66. This is not a strange or artificial context. These concerns resonate
throughout the opinion. Id.
67. The example is drawn from Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer,
26 Wash. App. 156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980).
68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1983).
69. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.110(1)(a) (1983).
70. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 197-10-170() (1983).
71. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v.Royer, 26 Wash. App. 156, 159,
612 P.2d 430, 433 (1980).
72. Id. at 158, 612 P.2d at 432.
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rules, and at the trial court, they have yielded what rules are
supposed to yield-predictability, certainty, and stability.
On appeal, however, the court reversed. 73 It turned out
that there was another way to describe what Seattle did to its
downtown area. Seattle established exclusive bus lanes for rush
hour traffic on two of its main thoroughfares. Taken together, that is what all those trivial changes produced. Because this was a "major action significantly affecting the
in SEPA, performquality of the environment," as defined
74
required.
be
to
seemed
EIS
ance of an
Certainly, that seemed to be the view of the court of appeals. But what about the EIS exceptions? The court of appeals decided that these were to be interpreted in light of
the comprehensive SEPA standard. Specifically, the court
directed agencies to apply the comprehensive SEPA standard of "major action significantly affecting the quality of
the "legislature inthe environment" to determine whether
75
tended these exemptions to apply."
The point of this story is simple. There are two ways of
describing what Seattle did: It altered lane markings, bus
zones, and sign markings, or it established a rush hour municipal transit system. Both are correct descriptions. If we
adopt the first description, then it is clear that the rules (the
EIS exceptions) apply and that the rules are certain, predictable, and stable. Once we recognize, however, that the city's
actions can be described in the second way, the rules (the
EIS exceptions) are no longer certain, predictable, or stable.
If the city's action can also be described as establishing a
rush hour municipal transit system, then arguments can be
made either way about whether the actions of the city are
covered by the rules or not. It all depends upon how we
want to describe the context in which the rules are said to
apply: the creation of a series of traffic signal changes or the
establishment of a rush hour municipal transit system.
Of course, we can deploy strategies to privilege one of
the two contexts. For instance, the court of appeals thought
that the regulations, even though framed as exemptions to
SEPA, should be subservient to the comprehensive SEPA
73. Id.
74. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1983).
75. 26 Wash. App. at 165, 612 P.2d at 436.
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standard. This is a hierarchy of sources of law argument.
But there is nothing conclusive about this argument. To
suggest that a SEPA statute is superior to SEPA regulations and
that the former controls the latter is hardly determinative of
the issue here. It can, no doubt, be argued that the statute
76
authorized the issuance of the exemptions at issue here.
There are other strategies that can be deployed to privilege
one description of the context above another. But none of
these strategies is completely successful. They merely defer
the choice of how to describe the context back to another
level. This is an example of the infinite regress mentioned
earlier.
The inadequacy of the vices and virtues vision can be
demonstrated from another angle. Consider what rules and
standards would have to accomplish in order to exhibit their
respective sets of virtues and vices. In order to be certain, a
directive would have to cordon off that section of the social
world which it governs, and it would have to subdivide that
world according to an invariant matrix and attach determinate consequences to each fraction of the subdivision. I do
not believe we think this is possible. It is not possible for the
simple reason that parts cannot determine their relation to
the whole. To put it another way, the text cannot define its
context. 77 If we concede that the sector of the social world
cordoned off by directive can be affected by the external
world, then the only way in which a directive can be certain
is if it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the effects of
the external world. This is tantamount to an admission that
in order to be certain, a rule must be flexible. At that point,
however, the rule-like character of the directive becomes
contaminated with standard-like qualities.
The same point can be made with respect to standards.
A standard is open-ended only to the degree that it is stable.
Standards are open-ended in that they do not create rigid
boundaries and can be applied to new and unforeseen situations. Yet if the meaning or content of the standard does
76. SEPA states that the state agency shall promulgate guidelines specifying
"[c]ategories of governmental actions which normally are to be considered as potential major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment as well
as categories of actions exempt from such classification ....
WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.21C.1 10(l)(a) (1983).
77. Fish, supra note 64, at 316, 330-31.
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not remain in some sense fixed, the standard will not be
open-ended at all. If there is no constancy to the standard, if
it is fully open, has no boundaries, can apply to any situation, then it will not be open-ended. It will be meaningless.
Consider, for instance, Justice Douglas' penumbral emanations in Griswold v. Connecticut.78 They were not open-ended
because they were not stable. They were not stable because
no one knew how far the constitutional clouds might drift.
79
The emanations were quickly cabined by his Brethren.
This line of reasoning quickly eliminates the possibility
of attributing specific virtues only to standards or only to
rules. As we have just seen, in order to be certain, a rule has
to be flexible. Similarly, in order to be open-ended, a standard has to be stable. These observations quickly collapse
into mischievously ambivalent propositions: Rules are certain when they are appropriately flexible; standards are
open-ended when they are appropriately stable. Once we
introduce flexibility in order to achieve certainty, and stability in order to achieve open-endedness, it is hard to know
where to stop. What degree of flexibility is appropriate for a
rule to be certain? What degree of stability is appropriate
for a standard to be open-ended? These questions are unanswerable. But the very fact that they are unanswerable
suggests that we lack any basis for claims such as "rules provide more certainty than standards," or "standards are more
open-ended than rules."
Just as there are ways of seeing rules as certain and stable and standards as flexible and individualized, there are
ways of seeing just the opposite. Rules produce a great deal
of certainty within their scope of application by banishing
troublesome concerns. This banishment or deferment creates uncertainty elsewhere. Consider the Seattle bus zone
case again. 80 There, the fact that the EIS exceptions seemed
to exempt a major environmental change from SEPA statu81
tory requirements resulted in a great deal of uncertainty.
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. Mr. Justice Douglas' constitutional clouds were not open-ended in the
sense that they did not give rise to recognition of an overwhelming number of
"new" constitutional rights. The emanations were sealed off from the start: The
other members of the majority articulated different grounds for their decision. Id.
80. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wash. App. 156, 612
P.2d 430 (1980); see supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
81. This uncertainty stemmed from the fact that the city's action seemed to be
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On one level, it is possible to say that the appellate court's
treatment of the issue provides yet another example in
which rules (the EIS exceptions) are certain and stable 82 and
all the uncertainty is created by the flexibility and manipulability of a standard (the SEPA requirement). But this account misses something: The court's resort to something
like the SEPA standards to resolve the issue was not surprising. In fact, this move could have been foreseen when the
EIS exceptions were first formulated. The very rule form of
those exceptions postponed the problem of what would happen when an activity fell clearly within the EIS exceptions,
but produced a major environmental change. This sort of
deferment is not an idiosyncratic characteristic of the EIS exceptions; it is a characteristic feature of rules.
The foregoing example might be construed as suggesting that rules produce a great deal of uncertainty
outside the clear scope of their application. But we should
not think that because the uncertainty occurs outside rather
than inside the clear scope of application that rules therefore
can be said to produce certainty. There are two reasons why
such a position is inadequate. First, as the Seattle case illustrates, we often care as much about the effects of a rule
outside its field of application as inside. Second, the inside/outside distinction is not fixed. The determination of
what might count as the "clear field of application" of a rule
is subject to dispute. For instance, prior to the court of appeals' decision in the Seattle case, it was arguable that the
EIS exceptions exempted any traffic sign or lane changes
from the SEPA requirements. The court of appeals decision, however, confirmed that this position was merely arguboth a major environmental change and to fall within the EIS exemptions. See
supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
82. Certainly that is what respondents argued:
The SEPA Guidelines themselves state at WAC 197-10-020(2),
"These guidelines were developed to establish methods and means
of implementing SEPA § [sic] in a manner which reduces duplicative
and wasteful practices, establishes effective and uniform procedures,
encourages public involvement and promotes certait with respect to
the requirements of the act." Certainty is not promoted when the
plain meaning of the regulations cannot be relied upon by local govemnment for obviously "minor new construction."
Brief of Additional Respondents at 13, Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v.
Royer, 26 Wash. App. 156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980) (copy on file at UCL4 Law
Review).
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able, not necessarily correct.8 3 Because rules do not
determine their own fields of application, these fields remain
contestable and contingent. In sum, rules necessarily entail
uncertainty-but this uncertainty is often difficult to see in
concrete situations because we typically defer or exteriorize
the uncertainty.
The same pattern of deferment and exteriorization occurs in our interpretation of standards. In accordance with
the vices and virtues vision, we tend to see standards as flexible. But there is a sense in which standards are not flexible
at all. Consider, for instance, the "balancing" or "totality of
circumstances" tests that are often used in constitutional
law.84 These tests viewed in isolation look very flexible. But
as soon as we consider how they are applied by judges, it
becomes apparent that these tests merely defer the constraints on judicial decision making to some external source
such as precedent. In other words, the very flexibility of balancing and totality of circumstances tests refers litigants and
judges to other stable norms to inform decision making.
This precedent boundedness is inflexible. But we tend not
to see this inflexibility as an aspect of the standard. Rather,
we see the inflexibility as external: If judges and litigants
pay too much attention to the facts of precedent, that is their
own choice, not something attributable to the standard form
of balancing or totality of circumstances tests-or so the argument goes. I think this is wrong: Inflexibility is just as
much a part of standards as their supposed flexibility.
Standards also harbor inflexibility in their unremittingly
expansionist tendencies. Standards have a constant tendency to extend their dominion over an increasingly larger
territory. Consider, for instance, the example of a standard I
gave at the beginning of this Article: Excessive loudness
85
shall be enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable harm.
Most likely this standard refers to noises or sounds. It does,
also, arguably, have something to say about building color
schemes, manner of dress, advertising signs, and undue intensity in the run of life generally. Again, it is often difficult
to see this inflexibility of standards because it is deferred or
83. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wash. App. 156, 165,
612 P.2d 430, 436 (1980).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 53.
85. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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exteriorized. The imperialistic tendencies of standards are
often seen as external to the standards, as a failure to constrain standards from the outside-a failure to exercise
"good judgment" or a failure to formulate external limits.
But the possibility of making such judgments depends upon
the possibility of grounding an inside/outside distinctionsomething that is not possible.
In short, rules and standards partake of certain virtues
only to the extent that they partake in the negations of those
virtues. Thus, rules can be said to provide more certainty or
stability, for instance, than standards, but this is correct only
in one part of the universe, here, where certainty and stability
are served by rules which provide uncertainty and instability
elsewhere. Now, if rules produce certainty and stability here
only by producing uncertainty and instability elsewhere, are
we to say that rules produce certainty or uncertainty, stability or instability? The answer to the question, of course, depends upon whether we are concerned with what happens
here or what happens elsewhere. More importantly, perhaps,
the question is who gets to decide what "here" and "elsewhere" might mean. Of course, the definition accorded to
"here" and "elsewhere" depends upon where one stands.
The point is that unless we are given some criteria to determine which effects of rule or standard application are relevant, there is no way to tie a particular set of virtues to rules
or to standards.
The foregoing attempt to deconstruct the vices and virtues vision of rules and standards is conceptual and abstract.
These very features of my deconstructive attempts may leave
the reader with the suspicion that, although the vices and
virtues vision is inadequate from a theoretical perspective, it
works pretty well in practice. As we look at the body of decisional law created by courts and agencies, rules seem certain
and stable whereas standards seem flexible and individuated. I have two basic answers to that contention.
The short answer is that if we are willing to look at the
body of court and agency decisional law in this way, we do so
because we are willing to supply the contextualization that
makes the rules seem certain and stable and makes the standards seem flexible and individuated. As members of the
legal community, we have learned not just a wealth of directives, but also a series of pictures (contexts) that correspond
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(albeit loosely) to these directives. It is often much easier
for us to shake commitments to existing directives than it is
for us to imagine different ways of picturing the contexts in
which the directives apply.
For instance, it seems difficult to imagine replacing the
"reasonable prudent person" standard in tort law with a rule
to define the standard of care. The immediate objection to
such a proposal is that a rule could not possibly be an adequate substitute for the reasonable person standard given
the multitude of varied situations in which that standard applies. This seems true enough. But notice what has happened here: The reason we can say that a rule cannot
adequately substitute for the reasonable person standard is
that we have left the context unchanged. The context remains "the multitude of varied situations" in which the reasonable person standard applies. If we redescribed the
context by breaking it down into component parts, for instance, automobile accidents, professional services, recreational activities, and so on, the possibility of establishing a
regime of rules seems much more plausible.
There is a longer answer to the contention that, in practice, rules and standards exhibit their stereotyped virtues.
When rules and standards fail to exhibit their stereotyped
virtues, we call into play two basic "avoidance strategies" to
help us conclude that this failure is not attributable to the
rule or the standard itself, but to some external factor.
One such "avoidance" strategy is the claim that uncertainty in rules and inflexibility in standards stem not from
the form of the directives, but rather from their substance.
The wrong rule or standard was chosen for the particular
situation. This is a tidy way of preserving the integrity of the
vices and virtues vision by banishing all nonconforming data
to the foreign realm of substance. One problem with this
tidy solution is that it begs the question. Since we are not
furnished any criteria to distinguish the realm of substance
from the realm ofform, it seems a bit suspicious to automatically explain away all nonconforming data by reference to
the substance of the directives. Moreover, the introduction
of substance to explain data that do not conform to the vices
and virtues model of the world destroys the intellectual
power of that model. Once we explain the deviation of rules
and standards from the vices and virtues model by reference
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to the substance of those rules and standards, we have introduced a limitation that threatens to swallow the model.
Once the applicability of the vices and virtues model is limited by the content of the rules and standards, the vision becomes entirely subordinate to considerations of substance.
The model becomes useless because its application is dependent upon that which we cannot a priori say anything about:
substance.
Another avoidance strategy used to explain deviations
from the vices and virtues vision is the notion that these deviations stem from misinterpretation of rules and standards.
If only the rules and standards were correctly interpreted,
they would exhibit their stereotyped vices and virtues. As
will be seen, this explanation ultimately fails as an avoidance
strategy. Nonetheless, it is worth considering in greater detail before disposal.
A number of familiar reasons can be advanced to explain why rules or standards are misinterpreted. Imagine
that a large federal agency is charged with enforcing Rule A
by adjudication. At first blush Rule A seems very clear and
readily comprehensible, but when applied by the agency it
appears quite uncertain, unstable, and insecure. Two basic
reasons can explain why Rule A fails to exhibit its stereotyped virtues. The first reason is agency hostility to the rule.
Such hostility might be inspired by moral conviction, political bias, vested interests, and so on. The second reason is
that agency decision makers might be incapable of understanding or administering the rule. The rule might require
expertise that they do not possess or evidence that is unavailable. Additionally, the decision makers might not have
"learned" the rule because of overload or lack of ready access to the rule.
There are a number of classic techniques available to
prevent the rule from exhibiting its stereotyped virtues in
practice:
1. FactualDistortion. The facts of a case can be characterized or distorted so that the rule does not apply or
applies in some unexpected manner.
2. Procedural Machinations. By tinkering with procedural mechanisms such as jurisdictional prerequisites,
evidentiary rules, timing of hearings, and timing of deci-
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sions, the decision makers can avoid having to apply the
rule, or can apply it in some truncated manner.
3. DoctrinalManipulation. By situating the rule in the
context of a hierarchy of directives, the decision makers
can narrow the field of application for the rule or distort
its meaning-even to the point where the rule is applied
as if it were a standard.
4. Creation of Subdirectives. Decision makers can thwart
implementation of a rule by arrogating to themselves
the authority to create subrules or substandards that
may be inconsistent with the rule. One common strategy involves reference to the decisional law under the
rule rather than the rule itself.
5. Circumvention by Appeal to Ultimate Directives. By situating the rule in a grander purposive scheme, decision
makers can redefine the rule. Strategies for accomplishing such reinterpretation include appeal to: (a) the
drafters' intentions, (b) the ostensible functions or policies behind the rule, (c) ultimate norms such as coherence, consistency, and equality, (d) classic mediating
devices for interpretation such as consequentialism,
utilitarianism, and majoritarianism.
6. Insubordination.
These techniques for subverting the rule form of directives
are also available to prevent standards from exhibiting their
stereotyped virtues.
The identification and description of these techniques
for subverting the meaning of rules and standards cannot
help save the vices and virtues vision. The reason is simple:
These techniques are used not only to subvert, but to preserve
the meaning of rules and standards. Indeed these techniques are just as much incidents of legitimate interpretation
as they are vehicles of misinterpretation. This can be seen
quite clearly if we consider the way in which these techniques are characterized. Indeed, the techniques of misinterpretation are not so different from the techniques of
legitimate interpretation:
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Misinterpretation Techniques
Factual distortion
Procedural machinations
Doctrinal manipulation
Creation of subdirectives
Circumvention by appeal to
ultimate directives
Insubordination
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Interpretation Techniques
Factual characterization
Procedural ordering
Doctrinal rationalization
Elaboration by
subdirectives
Justification by appeal to
ultimate directives
Initiative

The point is quite simply that, in the abstract, there is no
way to distinguish the misinterpretation techniques of the
left hand column from the interpretation techniques of the
right hand column. (Indeed, we might go so far as to say
that the techniques of interpretation and misinterpretation are
one and the same.) If the distinction between the techniques
of interpretation and misinterpretation is so treacherous, it
seems arbitrary to claim that data which do not conform to
the vices and virtues vision can be explained on the grounds
that they have been produced by misinterpretation. We
could make that claim, but there is little to recommend it
other than definitional fiat.
Despite all this, we do tend to think in terms of the vices
and virtues vision. The deconstruction of this vision suggests that there is less substance to this vision than it originally seemed to promise. The deconstruction also reveals
that there is nothing inexorable or inescapable about the
vices and virtues vision. The claim that rules are certain and
standards are flexible is just part of a game. This game (in
and of itself) need not be taken seriously. The foregoing
furnishes some techniques for avoiding the outcomes that
the game seems to predetermine.
I will now examine some variations on the vices and virtues vision that are used to explain the rules v. standards
dialectic. After examining each account, I will give my reasons for thinking that they are only slight variations on the
vices and virtues vision.
B.

Of Individualism and Altruism

Kennedy suggests that attempts to make sense of the
rules v. standards dialectic in terms of strategic choices of
which activities, acts, or persons we want to favor, deter, or
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authorize will necessarily be incomplete.86 He claims that
such an instrumentalist account of choices between rules
and standards leaves out the common sense intuition that
the choice for a particular form exhibits or contains commitments to a certain substantive vision of the world.8 7 Form is
never purely form, but an anticipation of substance. Kennedy then suggests that there is a structural similarity bestandards and the relation of
tween the relation of rules to 88
"altruism."
to
"individualism"
I think Kennedy is right in suggesting that the rules v.
standards dialectic cannot be explained in instrumentalist
terms alone. My reasons, however, are different from his.
The instrumentalist account of rules v. standards presupposes that goals and objectives, as well as the formulation of
strategic choices or issues, logically or temporally precedes
confrontation with the rules v. standards dialectic. This presupposition is wrong. The very statement of goals or objectives and the very framing of strategic choices is colored and
formed by the dialectic, and vice versa. An instrumentalist
account cannot explain choices between rules and standards
because, arguably, instrumentalist thinking itself depends
upon the formulation of choices and goals in rule-oriented
or standard-oriented terms.
Kennedy attempts to understand the dialectic by tying it
to substantive visions of the world which go under the rubrics of altruism and individualism. These two aspects of
political consciousness entail opposed values.
Individualism entails:

Altruism entails:

sharp distinction
between one's
interests and those
of others

community and
continuity of interests
between self and others

self-reliance
autonomy
facilitation
self-determination

sharing, sacrifice
community
regulation
paternalism

Kennedy attempts to show that arguments for rules bear a
striking resemblance to arguments for individualism and
86. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1710.
87. Id. at 1766-76.
88. Id. at 1713-22.
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that arguments for standards bear a striking resemblance to
arguments for altruism.8 9 In addition, Kennedy suggests
that proponents of rules often rely on the imagery surrounding the individualist vision whereas the proponent of standards often refers to imageries drawn from the altruist
vision.90 He concludes that "[t]here is a connection, in the
rhetoric of private law between individualism and a preference for rules, and between altruism and a preference for
standards." 9 ' But the argument breaks down.
Both altruism and individualism can generate arguments for both rules and standards. The belief in standards
as appropriate can have two sources. The altruist basis for
standards is the belief that there is a community of values
between the issuer of the directive and the parties addressed, or that the standard, by asserting its normativity,
can create such a community of values. The individualist basis for standards is the view that the world is so disorganized
and fragmented that the individual can only be given his due
by a system of standards.
Likewise, the commitment to rules has both an altruist
and an individualist basis. The individualist basis for rules is
the view that the world is really a fairly simple place to taxonomize, that everyone is capable of understanding this taxonomy, and that it need only be set forth clearly in order to
enhance the pursuit of individual ends. The altruist basis for
rules is the view that the world is hopelessly complex, but
that, if one is going to subject the social morass to collective
goals and overcome fragmentation, rules may well be
necessary.
Both individualism and altruism will at various times require arguments for both rules and standards. Hopeful individualism and despairing altruism both provide bases for
arguing for rules. Hopeful altruism and despairing individualism both provide bases for arguing for standards. 92
89. Id. at 1713-76.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1776.
92. This is not to say that in an individualist heaven there would be only rules
and in an altruist heaven there would be only standards. Both individualism and
altruism remain in a paradoxical relation to law. The rule of law denies and prevents the realization of both individualist and altruist utopias. Rules are the necessary yet antagonistic condition of individual self-realization. Rules deny the
individualist project by limiting the options of self-realization from the start. On

1985]

RULES AND STANDARDS

421

Ultimately, Kennedy's account is not so different from
the vices and virtues vision. Like that vision, his account
seeks to rationalize an aspect of form (the dialectic) by reference to an aspect of substance (the conflict between altruist
and individualist visions). The interesting question is
whether we should look at it the other way around: Perhaps
the conflict between altruism and individualism can be explained in terms of the dialectic. In other words, perhaps
the altruism v. individualism controversy is what emerges
when we project the dialectic onto the political plane.
What is the relation of Kennedy's structuralist account
of the dialectic to the vices and virtues vision? Kennedy's
account is distinguishable in that he refuses to accord normative coherence to the dialectic. In common with the vices
and virtues vision, he continues to endow the dialectic with
normative (or political) significance, but in contrast to that
vision, he embraces the oppositional character of the dialectic. The oppositional character of the dialectic for Kennedy
is a manifestation of some greater political or normative
schism that has its seat in the structural configurations of
political consciousness.
In short, Kennedy acknowledges the irreconcilable
character of the dialectic and seeks to account for it with a
greater and grander irreconcilable: a schism of political consciousness. The structure of this account is a classic one.
Phenomena (such as the dialectic) are understood by placing
them in a grander or greater context.
The classic problem with this move is that the greater or
grander context may well not be greater or grander at all.
For instance, Kennedy's strategy risks lapsing into a near
tautological replication of the rules v. standards dichotomy
by translating the dialectic into the language of political conthe other hand, rules create a sphere within which the self is protected from interference. Standards are the necessary yet contradictory condition of altruism.
Standards are necessary to enforce altruist projects. On the other hand, the need
to enforce an altruist project by means of a coercive apparatus aimed at regulating
sodal life, such as liberal legalism, ultimately belies the existence of the altruist
project. Coercive authority, even if clothed in the garb of normative language
such as standards, does not for that reason lose its authoritarian character.
From the perspective of either utopia, both rules and standards are unacceptable. The negation of individualism by rules and the negation of altruism by standards yields not just contradiction, but irony. The revolt of altruism against rules
(but not standards) and the rebellion of individualism against standards (but not
rules) would be, on this account, false consciousness.
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sciousness. Kennedy's models of altruism and individualism
might be nothing more than an illustration of what happens
when the dialectic is projected into political consciousness.
The dialectic may be the greater and grander context that
accounts for altruism and individualism rather than the
other way around: The dialectic might well be primordial.
Another classic problem with Kennedy's strategy is that
in privileging a particular realm (here, political consciousness) the description of what does or does not belong in that
realm becomes problematic. In his article, Kennedy has sub
silentio failed to import the dialectic into the realm of political consciousness. Thus, while individualism and altruism
reside, so to speak, in the privileged domain of political consciousness, the dialectic remains outside. The dialectic is
banished from the realm of political consciousness so that
the latter can explain the nature of the dialectic. But why
doesn't the dialectic also "reside" in that privileged domain
called political consciousness?
Of course, in one sense the dialectic does "reside" in
political consciousness-it is there in the form of the irreconciliable constructs, of individualism and altruism. The
problem for Kennedy, then, is to relate individualism and
altruism on the one hand to the dialectic on the other.
When the work of deconstruction is through, as we have
seen, no clear relation can be established. Rules can serve
altruism as well as individualism and standards can serve individualism as well as altruism. The reason for the absence
of any clear relation is that the dialectic mediates its own relation to the constructs of altruism and individualism.
It does no good to explain the dialectic in terms of consciousness-political or otherwise. Once we privilege consciousness, there is as good a reason to find there any one
thing as any other. And the question of what gets privileged
is merely replicated within the language used to describe
consciousness.
C. Of Polycentrism and Issues of One Variable
One possible account of the rules v. standards dialectic
is based on the notion that standards are more appropriate
when a legal issue involves a multitude of interrelated variables and that rules are more appropriate when the legal issue involves merely drawing a line between two competing
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concerns. 9 3 This explanation is weakened at the outset by
the recognition that the rules v. standards dialectic can arise
even when there are only two competing concerns. Indeed,
the standardized pro-con arguments about rules and 9stan4
dards were presented in the context of rigid dualities.
Still, there might be something to the claim that when a
multitude of interrelated variables must be taken into account, standards are more appropriate than rules. The argument is that in these circumstances, only a standard can
allow for the trade-offs and balancing required. The appeal
of this argument rests very much on the supposition that the
choice is between one rule and one standard. This underlying imagery suggests that while one rule must perforce be
simple, one standard can partake of infinite complexity.
But this underlying imagery must be questioned. If one
rule means simply the attachment of an either/or consequence to the presence or absence of one empirical phenomenon, then indeed standards might be more appropriate
than rules when the issue seems polycentric. This is a pyrrhic conceptual victory, however, because there is no reason
to suppose that one standard is more appropriate in dealing
with a polycentric issue than a collection of rules. Furthermore, even this point seems weak-what entitles us to call an
issue polycentric? To suggest that an issue is polycentric bespeaks a standard-like way of framing the issue: The rulelike response is that the assertion of polycentricity in any
given context stems from an improper amalgamation of conceptually distinct issues.
This approach based on a polycentric/unicentric distinction is also a variation on the vices and virtues vision.
While it refuses to rationalize the dialectic by connecting it
to normative values, this approach offers the minimal ration93. See supra note 58.
94. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. Moreover, the view that the
world and human beings are exceedingly diverse and complex does not lead to a
total commitment to governance by standards. For instance, Shiffrin, who is committed to an intuitionist political philosophy and an intuitionist approach to freedom of speech, is not for that reason committed to standard forms of governance.
Rather, he advances an "eclectic approach" that encompasses aspects of ad hoc
judgments and definitional balancings, as well as more rule-like categorical approaches. See Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1103, 1192-1217 (1983). The point is obvious, and that likely makes it worth
stating: One can adopt a standard-oriented approach that, because of strategic
concerns, will yield rules in practice.
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ality offormal coherence. Thus, the notion that standards are
appropriate when issues are polycentric and rules appropriate when issues are not polycentric can inform our choices
about whether to adopt rules and standards by making a
connection between the dialectic and another formal dimension of legal issues (poly- v. unicentricity). While more modest than the vices and virtues vision, this approach allows
judgments about what to do based on the view that there is a
normative coherence among various formal dimensions.
This, too, is a classic move. While we can rarely say anything
about how form relates to substance, we, at least, can say
intelligent things about how forms relate to other forms.
One classic problem with this approach is deciding
which form should be privileged? Which form should serve
to explain the other? Initially, we attempted to explain the
dialectic in terms of the poly- or unicentricity of the issue.
But then it became apparent that this description was backward and something like the reverse might be more accurate. We may be compelled to picture any given legal issue
in rule-oriented or standard-oriented ways before we can decide whether the issue is polycentric or not.
This brings us to another problem with this "formal coherence" approach. It cannot spark our interest unless formal coherence has some ascertainable relation to substance.
But by retreating to notions of formal coherence, we have
deprived ourselves of the ability to say anything about how
form relates to substance. Why would we ever be interested
in formal coherence for its own sake?
D.

The Epistemological Twist

One last attempt to explain the rules v. standards dialectic would be to suggest that standards are most appropriate
when we lack knowledge or information about an issue.
Thus, we can picture the development of a particular legal
standard, such as the reasonable person in tort law, leading
to the development of specific rules. 95 As the standard is
applied to an increasing number of situations, more knowledge is gained concerning its meaning and slowly it is trans95. Kennedy notes that this pattern is frequent. Kennedy, supra note 12, at
1690.
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formed into a collection of rules. 96
Certainly, we have seen examples of this transubstantiation of standards into rules.9 7 But, there are equally obvious
counterexamples. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, for instance, transformed a field of law once governed
by a meticulous architecture of rules into a domain of standards. 98 Quite obviously, the more counterexamples we develop, the more the epistemological twist seems inadequate.
The explanation fails for another reason. Upon closer
inspection, it turns out that standards are most appropriate,
not when we lack knowledge generally, but when we lack certain kinds of knowledge. Specifically, when we have difficulties evaluating the normative character of actions (but agree
about values), we are more likely to use standards. By contrast, when we lack knowledge (or consensus) about normative values, we are more likely to cast directives in the form
of rules.
There is an intuitive appeal to this more refined epistemological view-the economy of legal form it describes
seems plausible. Sometimes the type of knowledge we possess on a given issue will allow standards to work well and
compel rules to fail, whereas with other issues, the situation
might be reversed. With any given issue the appropriateness of rules or standards depends upon the comparative
status of our knowledge: Do we know more about how to
evaluate the facts or do we know more about what values to
pursue?
There is, however, another way to restate the prongs of
the distinction: is it the facts that we cannot evaluate? (if so,
use a standard); or is our problem a lack of knowledge about
values? (if so, use a rule). Restated in this manner, the distinction collapses. There is no place outside the dialectic
that would allow us to decide this issue. Here, too, the dialectic seems primordial.
96. Prosser's treatise on torts and its intensive specification of tort rules give
the lie to the idea that negligence is defined by some grand standard such as the
reasonable man test or the Learned Hand test of United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
173-217 (W.P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen 5th ed. 1984). For a discussion of the reverse rebellion of courts against the freezing of negligence in
mechanical rules, see id. at 217-19.
97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98. U.C.C. art. 9 (1977); see Gilmore, supra note 19.
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The epistemological twist is a specific illustration of a
classic move to reconcile oppositions in the face of imperfect
knowledge: the comparative scheme. The classic problem with
using comparative schemes to reconcile nonfungible oppositions, such as rules and standards, is that there is no single
language that can do justice to both of the oppositions. In
the very process of adopting a comparative scheme, one is
without a metaposition and one must necessarily prefer one
conception to the other. The adoption of a comparative
scheme is an attempt to temporize the irreconcilable oppositions. It fails because the irreconcilability of the oppositions
resurfaces in the attempt to develop a place from which to
implement the comparative scheme.
I have surveyed a number of attempts to rationalize or
understand the dialectic. There is power in each of the visions reviewed. There is also inadequacy in some crucial respects. The next Part is an attempt to come to grips with the
dialectic by explaining why it cannot be explained.
V.

THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE DIALECTIC

The dialectic is irreducible. We cannot make sense of it
in terms other than its own. Attempts to explain the dialectic founder for two reasons.
First, attempts to explain the dialectic in terms of substantive legal values, or other dimensions of legal form, or in
terms of political consciousness, succeed only in replicating
the dialectic in these other domains. 99 This yields the suspicion that these other domains, rather than explaining the dialectic, can themselves be understood in terms of the
dialectic. There is a rather vexing reversal going on here.
In trying to explain the dialectic by reference to substantive
values or political schisms, and so on, we end up doing quite
the opposite. It turns out that the dialectic seems primordial
and these other domains derivative.10 0
But there is more-the second reason we cannot explain the dialectic. The dialectic not only seems to replicate
itself in any domain we choose to use as the basis for explanation, but also seems to mediate the very relation of the
99. See supra text accompanying notes 64-98.

100. See supra text accompanying notes 64-98.
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dialectic to these fields. In other words, the relation of the
dialectic to these other fields is itself colored by the dialectic.
Both of these problems can be restated in simpler and
more abstract terms. I think it is worthwhile to state the propositions in this more general and abstract manner, not only
for the sake of clarity, but also because their application goes
beyond the understanding of the dialectic. Indeed, the foregoing attempts to understand the dialectic illustrate the general problems inherent in the enterprise of explaining
aspects of form by reference to substance.
The more abstract version goes like this. The dialectic
is an aspect of form. Legal scholars and lawyers typically try
to explain or understand form by relating it to substance.
To varying degrees, that is what the vices and virtues vision
and its variations attempt to do. There are two problems
with this approach.
The first problem is that every time we explain a form
(the dialectic) in terms of substance, we do not encounter
substance, but rather more form. In fact, we encounter the
very same form (the dialectic). This leads to two conclusions. The first is that we are engaged in tautologies. The
second is that substance does not explain form, but rather, it
is more likely the other way around. Form appears
primordial.
The second problem that we encounter in trying to explain form (the dialectic) by reference to substance is that
the relation between form and substance seems to be itself
colored by the form (the dialectic). The relation of form to
substance appears to be a question of form.
Why should these problems recur in our attempts to understand the dialectic? Consider this speculative answer.
First, all knowledges that might serve to explain the dialectic
are themselves entrapped in a dialectic of their own. In
other words, economics, psychology, sociology, and the
other social or human sciences are each internally split along
the lines of the dialectic. Second, very few people in law or
in other disciplines are firmly committed to any position
within the dialectic. In other words, virtually no one is committed to just the rule perspective or just the standard
perspective.
Within any of the social or human sciences, it is possible
to see a more rule-like or a more standard-like vision of the
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theoretical base or crucial tenets of the science. A rule-like
vision of the science uses a well-developed matrix of empirical categories to organize phenomena. The conclusions
reached by means of these categories seem mechanistic, preordained. Vulgar Marxism, or popular understandings of
Freud, for instance, might be examples of rule-like knowledges. The methodology of rule-like knowledges is conceptualist. It operates by defining and redefining categories and
classifying phenomena into predetermined classifications.
Standard-like knowledges, by contrast, do not have well defined conceptual grids. Rather, these knowledges are heuristic and open-ended. The categories are not really
categories at all. Rather, the structure of standard-like
knowledges is based upon evaluative parameters or variables
that overlap and seem fuzzy. Standard-like knowledges are
self-consciously evaluative. The methodology of these
knowledges operates by identifying relations, tendencies,
and directions.
There are serious objections to both of these types of
knowledges. Rule-like knowledges seem too simplistic. The
grids are too rigid. One has the feeling that phenomena are
crammed into the taxonomies whether they fit or not. Rulelike knowledges truncate much of what we would like explained by defining or classifying it away. Standard-like
knowledges fare differently, but no better. These knowledges seem so tentative, so epistemologically insecure, that
they furnish little in the way of learning. These knowledges
place too much importance on context: Everything becomes
a question of context. The evaluative parameters are too
many and too conflicting to be able to yield any predictions
about human behavior.
So here we are: caught between the violent and random
naming of rule-like knowledges and the ineffective groundless
evaluation of standard-like knowledges. If this vision of the
social or human sciences is correct, then these knowledges
cannot help us explain the dialectic. For one thing, the dialectic is replicated in the very structure of these knowledges.
For another, we are epistemologically dissatisfied with the
ruleness or the standardness of these knowledges. We already know the objections.
Indeed, our dissatisfaction with both rule-oriented and
standard-oriented approaches is reflected in the tendency of
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rules to evolve or degenerate, depending upon our perspective, into standards, and standards to evolve or degenerate
into rules. This tendency towards refinement or entropy occurs via some routine patterns:
1. Standards tend to become concretized by means of
specific rules. (The meaning of a general standard is found
in its specific applications.)
2. Rules tend to yield specific exceptions that are generated by appeal to other standards. (The meaning of a general rule is found in the standards limiting its application.)
3. When discrete sets of rules and rule-like exceptions
grow too large, they tend to be replaced by standards under
the guise of rationalizing the law. (Excessive "ruleness"
yields an attempt to rationalize by means of standards.)
4. When discrete sets of standards grow too large they
are ordered by means of overarching rules that prioritize the
standards and define rigidly their jurisdictional application.
(Standards must be ranked and prioritized.)
5. Terms which originally required standard-like thinking become frozen and are treated as rule-like names. (Even
language that on its face smacks of evaluation may eventually have a naming function.)
6. Terms that originally served as names in rule-like
constructs are redefined in terms of evaluative goals. (Even
language that seems clearly to refer to empirical phenomena
may become a term of art.)
7. Finally, of course, we get some radical breaks: A
whole set of issues previously subject to rule-like directives
is by fiat subject to a standard regime or vice versa.
CONCLUSION

A conclusion in a law review article is usually a tidy summation of what has transpired during the course of the reading. The virtue of a conclusion is that it ties together all the
various strands of the article and synthesizes the various
parts into a sensible bit of legal wisdom, complete, finished,
and, in appearance at least, unassailable. There is something comical about this ritual. For if we are convinced of
anything, it is that there are no conclusions, that things go
on, and that everything will always be revised.
A conclusion here would be particularly ironic. After
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all, this Article is about a dialectic I claim is omnipresent, yet
bereft of any synthesis. What to say? Here are a couple of
possibilities:
The mainstream message is that much of our legal argumentation seems to track a dialectic that is incapable of resolution. The steps in this argumentation are patterned and
predictable. We cannot be sure whether the argumentation
reflects anything of substance or not. Therefore, it behooves us to be on our guard when we find ourselves making these arguments and to consider whether they truly do
reflect concerns of substance or not. The danger of the dialectic is that we may think we are discovering something
about substance, when in fact we are only discovering something about form.
A less mainstream conclusion might go like this. Much
of legal argument tracks the dialectic. This dialectic cannot
be anchored in matters of substance. Indeed, the very attempt to explain this aspect of form in terms of substance
succeeds in doing quite the reverse: It puts us on the road
to explaining substance by means of form. The short of it is
that much of legal argumentation is simply an exercise in the
formalistic mechanics of a dialectic which doesn't go anywhere. The point of further study ought to be to ascertain
why and how it is that we allow such silly games to have such
serious consequences.

